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CLS BANK INTERNATIONAL V. ALICE CORP. PTY. LTD.: DETERMINING A
STANDARD FOR ABSTRACT IDEA PATENT ELIGIBILITY
© 2014 Zachary Lee
I. Introduction
To encourage innovation, patent eligibility is defined broadly by the categories identified in
§ 101 of the Patent Act of 1952. The Supreme Court has identified three implicit exceptions to
patent eligibility: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas,” 1 in order to preserve
free public access to fundamentally important concepts. 2 Patents that involve processing
otherwise-abstract ideas on computers have proven difficult to evaluate under § 101 and the
abstract-idea exception. In determining the patent eligibility of a method claim reciting the use of
a computer as a limitation, the Federal Circuit has looked to whether the computer plays “a
significant part” in the invention or is merely “an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to
be achieved more quickly.” 3 However, the court has not established a clear rule for determining
whether a computer plays a “significant part” in performing a claimed software method.
Recently, in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 4 the Federal Circuit considered the
patent eligibility of claims describing a method and system for “the management of risk relating

1

Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In keeping with a broad interpretation of
§ 101, these exceptions have been interpreted narrowly. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (noting that “too broad an interpretation of
[the exceptions to § 101] could eviscerate patent law”).
2
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253.
3
SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
4
717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
1

to specified, yet unknown, future events.” 5 In particular, the court examined how patents relate to
a computerized trading platform used for conducting financial transactions in which a third party
settles obligations between a first and a second party so as to eliminate “counterparty” or
“settlement” risk. 6 Ultimately, the court held that the use of a computer was not sufficiently
integral to the claimed invention to avoid patent ineligibility under the abstract-idea
exception. 7 CLS Bank illustrates that the Federal Circuit's current approach to patent eligibility of
software methods is indeterminate and can lead to seemingly contradictory results in similar
cases, producing large amounts of uncertainty surrounding patentability and thus harming
innovation.
II. Law Before the Case
A. Statutory Subject Matter and Common Law Exceptions
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 8 This statute sets forth four broadly
stated categories of patent-eligible subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures, and
compositions of matter. As the Supreme Court has explained, Congress intended that the
statutory categories would be broad and inclusive to best serve the patent system's constitutional
objective of encouraging innovation. 9 While the categories of patent-eligible subject matter

5

Id. at 1274.
Id..
7
Id. at 1288.
8
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
9
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (“In choosing such expansive terms as
‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress
plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.
Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (“Congress took this permissive approach to patent eligibility to ensure
6

2

recited in § 101 are broad, their scope is limited by three important judicially created exceptions.
“[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are excluded from patent eligibility, 10
because such fundamental discoveries represent “the basic tools of scientific and technological
work.” 11 The underlying concern is that patents covering such elemental concepts would reach
too far and claim too much, thus obstructing rather than catalyzing innovation. But danger also
lies in applying the judicial exceptions too aggressively because “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” 12
Accordingly, the basic steps in a patent-eligibility analysis can be summarized as follows: 13 We
must first ask whether the claimed invention is a process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter. 14 If not, the claim is ineligible under § 101. 15 If the invention falls within one of the
statutory categories, we must then determine whether any of the three judicial exceptions
nonetheless bars such a claim—is the claim drawn to a patent-ineligible law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea? 16 If so, the claim is not patent eligible. Only claims that pass both
inquiries satisfy § 101. 17

that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.’ ” (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at
308)).
10
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981) .
11
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
12
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
13
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
3

B. Foundational Section 101 Precedents
1. Gottschalk v. Benson
In Benson, the Supreme Court considered claims to computer-implemented methods “for
converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.” 18 The claims
each recited a series of data manipulation steps for effecting the indicated numerical conversion
and “purported to cover any use of the claimed method in a general-purpose digital computer of
any type.” 19 The Court identified the particular abstraction at issue as the freestanding
“algorithm” or “generalized formulation” for performing BCD to pure binary conversion. 20
Next, the Court measured the scope of the claims against the scope of that overarching abstract
idea. In practice, the claims were “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and
unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion” and would thus reach every application of
the basic conversion algorithm. This practice is in direct contrast to earlier cases concerning
patent-eligible process claims that had been cabined to discrete applications “sufficiently definite
to confine the patent monopoly within rather definite bounds.” 21 Furthermore, even though the
claims required a computer, 22 the Court did not view that as a meaningful limitation: “The
mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection
with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would
wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the

18

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 65.
22
Claim 8 required a computer on its face, but the literal terms of claim 13 were not so limited.
See Benson, 409 U.S. at 73-74. The CCPA, however, had interpreted both claims as requiring a
computer and had upheld them on that basis, see In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 687-88 (1971), and
the Supreme Court appeared to adopt that assumption.
19

4

algorithm itself.” 23 Thus the Court in this case found the invention ineligible patent subject
matter under § 101.
2. Parker v. Flook
Several years later in Parker v. Flook, the Supreme Court again considered the patent
eligibility of a computerized process—specifically, a method for updating alarm limits for
continuously monitored industrial process variables (e.g., temperature or pressure) according to a
disclosed mathematical formula. 24 The claim required three steps: measuring the present value
of a process variable, using the mathematical formula to calculate a new alarm limit in view of
the present value, and adjusting the previous alarm limit to the newly calculated limit. 25 A
further preamble limitation restricted the claim to processes “comprising the catalytic chemical
conversion of hydrocarbons,” so the claim did not cover “every conceivable application of the
formula.” 26 Although the claim would not “wholly preempt” the mathematical formula, the
Court nonetheless held that the claimed process fell under the abstract ideas exception to patent
eligibility. 27 In its analysis, the Court viewed the formula as an abstract principle and stated that
the case must “be considered as if the principle or mathematical formula were well known.” 28
The Court then asked whether, to confer patent eligibility, the claim contained sufficient
substance beyond the abstract mathematical formula itself—that is, “some other inventive
concept in its application”? 29 Concluding that the field-of-use, monitoring, adjusting, and

23

Id. at 71-72.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
25
Id. at 585.
26
Id. at 596.
27
Id. at 589.
28
Id. at 592.
29
Id. at 594 (“A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity to almost
any mathematical formula . . . .”).
24

5

computer limitations were trivial or “well known” under such an analysis, the Court held that the
claims were not patent eligible, “[i]f a claim is directed essentially to a method of calculating,
using a mathematical formula, even if the solution is for a specific purpose, the claimed method
is nonstatutory.” 30
3. Diamond v. Diehr
The claims at issue in Diehr were drawn to processes for curing synthetic rubber that
included “the use of a mathematical formula and a programmed digital computer.” 31 The claimed
methods included steps for operating a rubber molding press that included constantly
determining the temperature inside the mold, repetitively calculating the necessary cure time
using a mathematical formula known as the Arrhenius equation, and opening the press whenever
the elapsed cure time equaled the calculated necessary cure time.

32

Here the Court held the

claims to be patent eligible, a conclusion that was “not altered by the fact that in several steps of
the process a mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer are used.” 33 In contrast
to Benson and Flook, the claims in Diehr employed a mathematical concept but did “not seek to
preempt the use of that equation. Rather, they [sought] only to foreclose from others the use of
that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process.” 34 In particular,
the Court distinguished Flook on the basis that the claim there provided no substantive details
regarding the method's actual performance—rather, “‘[a]ll that it provides is a formula for
computing an updated alarm limit.’” 35 In contrast, in Diehr, the claimed process incorporating

30

Id. at 594-95.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 177 (1981).
32
Id. at 179.
33
Id. at 185.
34
Id. at 187.
35
Id. at 186-87 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 586).
31
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the Arrhenius equation also called for steps including “constantly measuring the actual
temperature inside the mold,” a step that was said to be new in the art. 36 The Court also
explained that a claim “does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula, computer program, or digital computer” because “an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection. 37 Because the claims at issue in Diehr were directed towards a specific application,
rather than an abstract idea, the claims satisfied § 101.
4. Bilski v. Kappos
Bilski concerned claims to processes for participants in energy commodities markets to
hedge against the risk of price changes in those commodities. 38 The claims recited the hedging
strategy as a series of steps involving transactions between a commodity provider and
commodity consumers and between the commodity provider and other market participants
“having a counter-risk position” to the consumers in order to balance risk; other claims
articulated the hedging strategy as “a simple mathematical formula.” 39 The claimed invention
did not involve a computer in Bilski. Applying Benson, Flook, and Diehr, the Supreme Court
held that the claims failed to recite a patent-eligible process because they covered the abstract
idea of hedging against risk. 40 “Allowing [the claims] would pre-empt use of this approach in all
fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.” 41 In addition, the Court
reiterated Flook 's admonition that such claims cannot be made patent eligible by “limiting an

36

Id. at 178.
Id. at 187.
38
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 3231.
41
Id.
37

7

abstract idea to one field of use or adding token post solution components.” 42 The Court rejected
the claimed invention, as it did not satisfy the requirements under § 101.
5. Mayo v. Prometheus
Most recently, the Supreme Court applied the “laws of nature” exception to claims
covering medical diagnostic methods to provide most guidance regarding patent eligibility. The
claims in Mayo laid out methods for optimizing thiopurine administration in a user-based on a
natural correlation between therapeutic efficacy of a particular amount of thiopurine and the
resulting amount of thiopurine metabolites in the patient’s blood. If the metabolite was too small
of an amount then the dose was not enough; too much metabolite showed that the dosage was too
large and should be reduced to avoid toxicity. 43 Due to this, the claims laid out the necessary
steps of giving the thiopurine drug and determining the resulting metabolite concentration in the
patient’s blood, wherein a concentration higher or lower than predefined limits showed that it
was necessary to alter the dosage. 44
The Supreme Court held that the claims failed the § 101 test for subject-matter eligibility.
The Court’s analysis began by stating that the claims “set forth laws of nature-namely,
relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a
dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.” 45 Therefore, the question was
“whether the claims do significantly more than simply describe these natural relations.” Did they
“add enough ” to the natural law to render the claimed processes patent eligible? 46 Examining
the other limitations, the Court concluded that the “administering” and “determining” steps did
42

Id.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294-95 (2012).
44
See id. at 1295 (claim 1).
45
Id. at 1296.
46
Id. at 1297.
43
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not sufficiently limit or were not inventive enough to confer patent eligibility: “Anyone who
wants to make use of these [natural] laws must first administer a thiopurine drug and measure the
resulting metabolite concentrations, and so the combination amounts to nothing significantly
more than an instruction to doctors to apply the applicable laws when treating their patients.” 47
Because these additional steps were mere “routine, conventional activity previously engaged in
by scientists who work in the field,” the Court held that they did not transform the law of nature
into a patent-eligible application of that law. 48
C. An Integrated Approach to § 101
There are several common threads that go throughout the Supreme Court’s decisions that
help guide the analysis in § 101 cases. The first and greatest concern is that patents should not
be allowed to preempt the fundamental tools of discovery—those must remain “free to all…and
reserved exclusively to none.” 49 Preemption features highly in the Supreme Court’s recent § 101
decisions, and goes back to some of the earliest judicial holdings that go towards subject matter
eligibility. 50 The primary aim in applying common law exceptions is to guard against
preemption of fundamental principles.
Next, the case law repeatedly illustrates that patent applicants must take caution against
overly formalistic approaches to subject-matter eligibility that would ask for manipulation.
Allowing the determination of patent eligibility to “depend simply on the draftsman's art ...
would ill serve the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for ‘ideas' or phenomena

47

Id. at 1298.
Id.
49
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
50
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
48

9

of nature.” 51 With that being stated, claim drafting strategies that attempt to go around the basic
exceptions of subject-matter eligibility should not be credited. The Supreme Court’s precedents
necessitate that we look past such strategies when examining to decide its true practical meaning
with respect to the purpose of subject matter eligibility, thus preserving the “basic tools” of
scientific discovery for everyone and not just patent holders. 52
Finally, the cases dictate a flexible, claim-by-claim approach to subject matter eligibility
that avoids bright line rules. Rigid line drawing may be easy to use, but they are many times
impractical and counterproductive when applied to subject matter eligibility. Such rules risk
becoming outdated in the face of ever advancing technology; they risk “freez[ing] process
patents to old technologies, leaving no room for the revelations of the new, onrushing
technology.” 53 Stringent eligibility formulas may also lead to misplaced focus, requiring courts
to “pose questions of such intricacy and refinement that they risk obscuring the larger object of
securing patents for valuable inventions without transgressing the public domain.” 54
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has rejected calls for a categorical exclusion of so-called
business method claims and has held that the formulaic “machine-or-transformation” test cannot
be the exclusive means for determining the patent eligibility of process claims. 55 What is needed
is a flexible, pragmatic approach that can adapt and account for unanticipated technological
advances while remaining true to the core principles underlying the fundamental exceptions to
§ 101.

51

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 593 (1978).
CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1281.
53
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
54
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
55
Id. at 3227-29.
52
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With these basic principles in mind, the courts tend to apply the following analysis in
determining whether a computer-implemented claim recites patent-eligible subject matter under
§ 101 or falls into the common law exception for abstract ideas. The first question is whether the
claimed invention fits within one of the four statutory classes. Assuming that condition is
achieved, the analysis turns to the judicial exceptions to subject-matter eligibility. A preliminary
question in applying the exceptions to such claims is whether the claim raises § 101 abstractness
concerns at all. Does the claim pose any risk of preempting an abstract idea? In most cases, the
answer will plainly be no. 56
Where a subject-matter eligibility issue arises, it is important at the beginning to discover
and define what fundamental concept appears in the claim so that the next steps can proceed on
an even footing. One cannot meaningfully evaluate whether a claim preempts an abstract idea
until the idea supposedly at risk of preemption has been unambiguously identified. Although not
required, conducting a claim construction analysis before addressing § 101 may be especially
helpful in this regard by facilitating a full understanding of what each claim entails. 57
Now that the abstract idea has been identified, the claim can be evaluated to decide if it
contains more limitations so that it does not preempt the full abstract idea itself. 58 The
requirement for limitations further than a mere fundamental concept has been referred to as an

56

Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (D.Minn. Oct. 19, 1973),
available at 1973 WL 903.
57
See Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1273-74 (2012).
58
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2012)
(discussing a patent-eligible process claim that involved a law of nature but included additional
steps “that confined the claims to a particular, useful application of the principle”); Bilski, 130 S.
Ct. at 3231 (rejecting claims that “add [too little] to the underlying abstract principle”); Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 177, 187 (1981) (“[T]hey do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation.
Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of
the other steps in their claimed process.”).
11

“inventive concept.” 59 An “inventive concept” in the subject-matter eligibility context refers to a
genuine human contribution to the claimed subject matter. “The underlying notion is that a
scientific principle ... reveals a relationship that has always existed.” 60 Given this notion, an
inventor cannot truly make an abstract idea. With that being stated, an “inventive concept”
under § 101—in contrast to whatever fundamental concept is also represented in the claim—
must be “a product of human ingenuity.” 61 Also, the human ingenuity must be more than a
trivial addition to the abstract idea. Limitations that represent a human contribution but are
merely tangential, routine, well-understood, or conventional, or in practice fail to narrow the
claim relative to the fundamental principle therein, cannot confer patent eligibility. 62 Whether a
particular claim satisfies the § 101 standard will vary based on the balance of factors at play in
each case, and the fact that there is no easy bright-line test simply emphasizes the need for the
United States Patent and Trademark Office and the courts to apply the flexible analysis above to
the facts at hand. 63 Analyzing patent eligibility, in contrast, considers whether steps combined
with a natural law or abstract idea are so insignificant, conventional, or routine as to yield a
claim that effectively covers the natural law or abstract idea itself. 64
III. Statement of the Case
A. Alice’s Patents
Alice owns the ′479, ′510, ′720, and ′375 patents by assignment. The patents, which all
derive from the same family and share close to the same specification, deal with “the

59

See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 593 n.15 (1978).
61
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
62
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
63
Id.
64
Id.
60
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management of risk relating to specified, yet unknown, future events.” 65 Specifically, the
patents relate to a computerized exchange stage used for making financial transactions in which
another party settles obligations between a first and second party so as to eliminate
“counterparty” or “settlement” risk. 66 Settlement risk refers to the risk to each party in an
exchange that only one of the two parties will actually pay its obligation, leaving the paying
party without its principal or the benefit of the counterparty's performance. Alice’s patents
attempt to hedge that risk by trusting a third party to guarantee the exchange of either both
parties’ obligations or neither obligation. 67
When parties agree to a trade, in some instances there could be a delay between the time
that the parties enter a contractual agreement forcing themselves to abide by the trade and the
time of settlement when the agreed upon trade is actually executed. 68 In most cases, the parties
would complete the trade by paying or exchanging their mutual obligations after the intervening
period, but in some instances a party might be rendered unable to pay during that time and fail to
notify the other party before settlement. 69 As disclosed in Alice’s patents, a third party can be
used to “verify each party's ability to perform before actually exchanging either of the parties'
agreed-upon obligations.” 70
The claims currently before the court consist of claims 33 and 34 of the ′ 479 patent and
all claims of the ′510, ′720, and ′375 patents. The relevant claims of the ′479 and ′510 patents

65

Id. at 1274.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 col. 5 ll.61-63 (filed Oct. 19, 1999) (“The invention
also encompasses apparatus and method dealing with the handling of contracts at maturity, and
specifically the transfer of entitlement.”).
66
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recite “methods of exchanging obligations between parties, the claims of the ′720 patent are
drawn to data processing systems, and the claims of the ′375 patents claim data processing
systems as well as computer-readable media containing a program code for directing an
exchange of obligations.” 71
B. District Court Proceedings
On May 24, 2007, CLS brought a suit against Alice seeking a declaratory judgment of
non-infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability as to the ′479, ′510, and ′720 patents. 72 Alice
responded and counterclaimed, alleging infringement. 73 By the agreement of the parties, the
district court allowed limited initial discovery, addressing only the questions of (i) the operations
of CLS, and (ii) CLS's relationship with the accused CLS system. 74
In March 2009, following limited discovery, CLS moved for summary judgment
claiming that Alice’s claims were ineligible subject matter and therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 and that any infringement could not have occurred in the United States. 75 Alice filed
cross-motions on both issues. The district court denied CLS’s motion as to extraterritoriality
holding that CLS’s alleged infringing actions fell within the reach of domestic patent law. 76
With regards to subject-matter eligibility under § 101, the district court summarily denied the
parties’ motions, without prejudice to refiling, after the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the decision in In re Bilski. 77

71

CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1274.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1275.
76
Id.
77
Id.
72
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During this time, the ′ 375 patent issued, and Alice filed amended counter claims also
asserting that CLS infringed every claim of the ′ 375 patent. 78 After the Supreme Court issued
its decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the parties renewed their cross motions for summary judgment
on the question of validity under § 101, with CLS adding invalidity arguments drawn to the
newly issued ′ 375 patent issued. 79 Along with the parties’ briefs, the district court also relied on
“(i) the asserted patents themselves, (ii) excerpts from the patents' prosecution histories, (iii)
various guidelines issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) regarding
the application of § 101 during patent examination, and (iv) a declaration submitted by Alice's
expert Paul Ginsberg.” 80 Specifically, Paul Ginsberg described the operation of Alice’s methods
and systems, and opined that “a person of skill in the art reading the asserted patents would
conclude that the claimed inventions must be implemented electronically using some type of
computing processor and memory.” 81
The district court did not conduct claim construction before reaching the merits of the
§ 101 issue, but the parties agreed for purposes of deciding their summary judgment motions that
Alice’s claims should all be interpreted to “require a computer including at least a processor and
memory.” 82 Using the parties’ agreement, the district court assumed that all of the asserted
claimed needed electronic implementation, discussing consistent disclosures in the patents’
specifications as well as Mr. Ginsberg’s statements. 83

78

Id.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
79
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Given this understanding of the claims, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of CLS, finding that every one of the asserted claims of Alice’s patents are invalid under
§ 101. 84 The district court decided that Alice’s method claims “are directed to an abstract idea of
employing an intermediary to facilitate simultaneous exchange of obligations in order to
minimize risk.” 85 Furthermore, the district court found the asserted system claims ineligible as
well, as those claims “would preempt the use of the abstract concept of employing a neutral
intermediary to facilitate simultaneous exchange of obligations in order to minimize risk on any
computer, which is, as a practical matter, how these processes are likely to be applied.” 86 The
asserted media claims failed on the same ground as “directed to the same abstract concept
despite the fact they nominally recite a different category of invention.” 87 Accordingly, the
district court entered final judgment in favor of CLS, and Alice appealed.
IV. Decision of the Case
It is necessary to note that in deciding this case the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit had five (5) out of its nine (9) members in concurrence with one another, but
there were also five (5) different opinions issued with several members concurring in part and
dissenting in part. This anomaly shows just how in flux the law is when deciding patent eligible
subject matter for claims using a computer as software.
A. Method Claims
Claim 33 of the ′479 patent is representative of the asserted method claim. The claim
thus recites a method for facilitating a previously arranged exchange between two parties

84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1276.
85
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requiring the use of “shadow” records maintained by a third-party “supervisory institution.”88
Although claim 33 did not expressly recite any computer-based steps, the parties had agreed that
the recited shadow records and transactions require computer implementation. 89 The court found
that the claim is clearly a process claim, and that the analysis next depends upon whether the
claim is more than a patent ineligible abstract idea. 90 The methods claimed here draw on the
abstract idea of reducing settlement risk by effecting trades through a third-party intermediary
(here, the supervisory institution) empowered to verify that both parties can fulfill their
obligations before allowing the exchange. 91 The court stated that this claim was an abstract idea,
because it is a “disembodied” concept, a basic building block of human ingenuity, untethered
from any real-world application. 92
Given that the court found the claim to be an abstract idea, their analysis next focused on
whether the rest of the claim “adds significantly more” to the abstract idea. Apart from the idea
of third-party intermediation, the claim's substantive limitations require creating shadow records,
using a computer to adjust and maintain those shadow records, and reconciling shadow records
and corresponding exchange institution accounts through end-of-day transactions. The court
found that none of these limitations added anything of substance to the claim. 93
In this section of the ruling, the court discussed the reasons for the holding of noneligible. The court found that the requirement for computer implementation could scarcely be
introduced with less specificity: the claim lacks any express language to define the computer's

88

Id. at 1285.
Id.
90
Id. at 1285-86.
91
Id. at 1286.
92
Id.
93
Id.
89
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participation. 94 The court stated, “In a claimed method comprising an abstract idea, generic
computer automation of one or more steps evinces little human contribution.” 95 The court also
found that, “simply appending generic computer functionality to lend speed or efficiency to the
performance of an otherwise abstract concept does not meaningfully limit claim scope for
purposes of patent eligibility.” 96 Thus, the court held that the requirement for computer
participation in the claims fails to supply an “inventive concept” that represents a nontrivial,
nonconventional human contribution or materially narrows the claims relative to the abstract idea
they embrace. 97 The court also held that requiring the supervisory institution to create and adjust
a “shadow credit record” and a “shadow debit record” did not save the claims from being
abstract. 98 The court similarly held that “providing end-of-day instructions to the exchange
institutions to reconcile the parties' real-world accounts with the day's accumulated adjustments
to their shadow records is a similarly trivial limitation that does not distinguish the claimed
method.” 99 Thus, the court found this claim patent ineligible subject matter.
Several of the other judges used different language and reasoning, but nevertheless
ultimately found that Alice’s asserted method claims were patent ineligible.
B. Computer-Readable Medium Claims
The court next turned their focus towards Claims 39–41 of the ′375 patent. The court
found that on the face the claims seems as though they are physical, and not abstract, that in
reality the draftsmen had craftily worded the claim in such a way to hide that the claim is in fact

94

Id.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1286-87.
99
Id. at 1287.
95
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abstract. 100 The court found that the “claim presents a physical recitation of an abstract method,
and parallel claims from the same patent family claim that same abstract method in the same or
similar terms.” 101 The court held that these claims failed the patent eligibility test for the same
reasons as the method claims discussed above. 102 Similarly to the method claims, two other
judges, in addition to the majority opinion, concluded that the computer-readable medium claims
are patent ineligible.
C. System Claims
The court next looked at the system claims, which were “data processing systems”
configured to enable the exchange of mutual obligations through an intermediary—in these
claims, the computer system itself. 103 The court found that “the system claims are formally
drawn to physical objects and therefore raise a question whether they deserve to be evaluated
differently under the abstract ideas exception from the accompanying method claims discussed
above.” 104 The court answered this question with a no; stating that competent draftsmen (of
which the Supreme Court in their jurisprudence has warned of on multiple occasions) would be
able to claim draft around the physical objects exception. 105 In this finding the court decided that
whenever there is a subject matter eligibility question, regardless of claim format, the analysis
should consist of: “Does the claim, in practical effect, place an abstract idea at risk of
preemption? And, if so, do the limitations of the claim, including any computer-based
limitations, add “enough” beyond the abstract idea itself to limit the claim to a narrower, patent-
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eligible application of that idea? Or, is it merely a Trojan horse designed to enable abstract
claims to slide through the screen of patent eligibility?” 106
After deciding how the claims should be analyzed the court next turned to the claims
themselves to find that “instead of wholly implied computer limitations, the system claims recite
a handful of computer components in generic, functional terms that would encompass any device
capable of performing the same ubiquitous calculation, storage, and connectivity functions
required by the method claims.” 107 The court decided that although the claims use computer
limitations that in fact none of the recited hardware offers a meaningful limitation beyond
generally linking “the use of the system to a particular technological environment,” that is,
implementation via computers. 108 The court also decided that every general-purpose computer
will include “a computer,” “a data storage unit,” and “a communications controller” that would
be capable of performing the same generalized functions required of the claimed systems to carry
out the otherwise abstract methods recited therein. 109 One of the separate opinions in this case,
concurring in part in the judgment, takes aim at this opinion, asserting that the system claims
here are simply claims to a patent-eligible machine, a tangible item one can put on one's desk. 110
In response to this concurring opinion the majority stated that “The Supreme Court has spoken
since Alappat on the question of patent eligibility, and we must take note of that change. Abstract
methods do not become patent-eligible machines by being clothed in computer language.” 111
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The court held that these claims were not limiting enough, and thus ineligible patent subject
matter.
V. Analysis
It is clear from the multitude of opinions issued in this case, that there is much flux in
regards to subject matter eligibility, specifically computer-enabled expression of an abstract idea.
The multitude of opinions shows that the rule creates unnecessary unpredictability. Given the
rapidly developing fields in computer science, the innovation may be difficult to predict. Thus, a
flexible test may be to the advantage of the courts. It is of the opinion of this Note that the courts
should adopt a rule in the context of machine-or-transformation analysis: if the use of a computer
in the claimed invention gives any functional benefit other than increased efficiency, the claims
should thus satisfy § 101 and be patentable subject matter. This rule could reduce uncertainty,
while also giving a little bit of flexibility. The rule also draws on previous Federal Circuit and
Supreme Court precedents regarding software included with an abstract idea, similar to Bilski.
This flexible guideline would allow the courts to look at the functionality of a specific computer
based claim, decide on how using a computer would alter the claim as opposed to using it by
hand, and then determine if there are any differences that provide a benefit other that added
efficiency compared to manual performance. If there were to be a functional benefit, then the
claim should be patentable subject matter.
This rule would provide several articulable benefits. Perhaps most importantly it would
reconcile the tension between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court. This rule would also
improve predictability for inventors attempting to discern whether an invention would likely
satisfy § 101 and be patent eligible subject matter. It is much easier to discern if executing a
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method on a computer provides benefits outside of efficiency, than it is to determine if executing
a method on a computer is integral.
Although the Courts in Mayo and Bilski declined to move toward an exclusive rules
based approach in regards to § 101 jurisprudence, this proposed rule does not need to be applied
exclusively. This proposed rule can be seen as a new definition for the machine test under the
machine-or-transformation test. When there are facts of a case that show other important
considerations that are not viewed under the machine-or-transformation test, the courts should be
able to view these considerations along with the machine-or-transformation test to determine
patent eligibility.
The method claims in CLS Bank, most notably the exchange-facilitation platform
described by the patents may offer some benefits in addition to efficiency. For example, escrow
agents are valuable because they are trusted third parties. The claims in CLS Bank provide the
functionality of an escrow agent on a computerized trading platform, which may increase trust in
an online marketplace. Using the proposed rule, the court would find that this satisfies the
machine-or-transformation exception to an abstract idea, as the invention claims the use of a
computer in the that gives a functional benefit other than increased efficiency, the claims should
thus satisfy § 101 and be patentable subject matter.
IV. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has identified three implicit exceptions to patent eligibility: “laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas,” in order to preserve free public access to
fundamentally important concepts. Patents that involve processing otherwise-abstract ideas on
computers have proven difficult to evaluate under § 101 and the abstract-idea exception. In
determining the patent eligibility of a method claim reciting the use of a computer as a limitation,
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the Federal Circuit has looked to whether the computer plays “a significant part” in the invention
or is merely “an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly.”
However, the court has not established a clear rule for determining whether a computer plays a
“significant part” in performing a claimed software method. Recently, in CLS Bank International
v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., the Federal Circuit considered the patent eligibility of claims describing
a method and system for “the management of risk relating to specified, yet unknown, future
events… In particular, the patents relate to a computerized trading platform used for conducting
financial transactions in which a third party settles obligations between a first and a second party
so as to eliminate “counterparty” or “settlement” risk.” The court then held that the use of a
computer was not sufficiently integral to the claimed invention to avoid patent ineligibility under
the abstract-idea exception. CLS Bank illustrates that the Federal Circuit's current approach to
patent eligibility of software methods is indeterminate and can lead to seemingly contradictory
results in similar cases, producing large amounts of uncertainty surrounding patentability and
thus harming innovation. Rather than allowing this approach to continue, the Federal Circuit
should adopt a rule, derived from its existing jurisprudence, that any software implementation of
a method performable without a computer is patent eligible if the computer provides some
functional benefit other than efficiency.
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